Welcome to the Internet Sanctions Project - Revision history

Woody: /* Why does this project exist? */

2024-01-15T12:59:20Z

Why does this project exist?

Woody: /* Structure */

2022-08-11T14:04:35Z

Structure

Erica1: /* Why does this project exist? */

2022-06-02T14:29:26Z

Why does this project exist?

Erica1: /* Why does this project exist? */

2022-06-02T14:26:14Z

Why does this project exist?

Erica1: /* Why does this project exist? */

2022-06-02T14:18:53Z

Why does this project exist?

Woody: /* Why does this project exist? */

2022-03-31T13:30:00Z

Why does this project exist?

Woody at 13:21, 29 March 2022

2022-03-29T13:21:04Z

Woody at 13:12, 29 March 2022

2022-03-29T13:12:35Z

Woody at 13:11, 29 March 2022

2022-03-29T13:11:54Z

Woody at 13:06, 29 March 2022

2022-03-29T13:06:07Z

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 === Why does this project exist? ===
-Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years], but their use has become particularly widespread in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Most sanctions used since the Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United Nations. Over the past 20 years, however, impasse at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional organisations also use their own autonomous (or unilateral) sanctions.  These can supplement multilateral (UN) sanctions, or can be imposed entirely in their absence. All sanctions regimes employed today are supposed to be "targeted" or "smart" (geared to only impact on certain targets and not a country's entire population).
+Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years], but their use has become particularly widespread in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Most sanctions used since the Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United Nations. Over the past 20 years, however, impasse at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional organisations also use their own autonomous (or unilateral) sanctions.  These can supplement multilateral (UN) sanctions, or can be imposed entirely in their absence. All sanctions regimes employed today are supposed to be "targeted" or "smart" (geared to only impact certain targets and not a country's entire population).
 The United States (US) is the most prolific user of autonomous sanctions, followed by the European Union (EU). A number of other nations, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and Japan also use autonomous sanctions; often in close coordination with one another. All regional organisations (such as the African Union and the League of Arab States) use sanctions against their own members, but the EU is the only one to use it as a tool of external foreign and security policy.

@@ Line 21: / Line 21: @@
 The project is implemented by five working groups:
-* A [[Policy:Policy Group|'''policy group''']] monitors the political situation and the sanction initiatives of national governments, and evaluates whether a situation or proposed sanctions is relevant in light of the project's principles. If a sanction is deemed in-scope, the policy group defines the situation and (potentially) sanctioned entities and passes them to the [[Open Source Intelligence|OSINT group]]. The policy group is responsible for determining the limited scope of measures, analyzing when existing sanctions should be repealed, and for liaising with governments which are considering declaring this mechanism to be sufficient compliance with their nationally-defined sanctions.
+* A [[Policy:Policy Group|'''policy group''']] monitors the political situation and the sanction initiatives of national governments, and evaluates whether a situation or proposed sanctions is relevant in light of the project's principles. If a sanction is deemed in-scope, the policy group defines the situation and (potentially) sanctioned entities and passes them to the [[Open Source Intelligence|intelligence group]]. The policy group is responsible for determining the limited scope of measures, analyzing when existing sanctions should be repealed, and for liaising with governments which are considering declaring this mechanism to be sufficient compliance with their nationally-defined sanctions.
 * An [[Open Source Intelligence|'''intelligence group''']] investigates and catalogs the Internet resources (IP addresses, Autonomous System numbers, and domain names) held by sanctioned entities. This helps the [[Policy Group|policy group]] understand the (potential) impact of measures and assess their proportionality.

@@ Line 7: / Line 7: @@
 The United States (US) is the most prolific user of autonomous sanctions, followed by the European Union (EU). A number of other nations, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and Japan also use autonomous sanctions; often in close coordination with one another. All regional organisations (such as the African Union and the League of Arab States) use sanctions against their own members, but the EU is the only one to use it as a tool of external foreign and security policy.
-In contemporary times, the private sector within each nation is responsible for complying with sanctions adopted by the government where a given company is based. This can include multilateral and autonomous sanctions.  In some cases, the US employs secondary sanctions, which have an extraterritorial reach, which means that all individuals, companies and other entities can be subject to US sanctions under certain regimes.  The most common types of sanctions used by all actors are asset freezes (against individuals or entities), travel bans (against individuals) and arms embargoes.  Since the early 2010s, there have been a rise in sectoral sanctions, such as those against finance, banking, energy and other commodities (in part, or in full). Some sanctions regimes have become so broad and hard-hitting that they can be considered de-facto comprehensive embargoes (or comprehensive sanctions).
+In contemporary times, the private sector within each nation is responsible for complying with sanctions adopted by the government where a given company is based. This can include multilateral and autonomous sanctions.  In some cases, the US employs secondary sanctions, which have an extraterritorial reach, which means that all individuals, companies and other entities can be subject to US sanctions under certain regimes.  The most common types of sanctions used by all actors are asset freezes (against individuals or entities), travel bans (against individuals) and arms embargoes.  Since the early 2010s, there have been a rise in sectoral sanctions, such as those against finance, banking, energy and other commodities (in part, or in full). Some sanctions regimes have become so broad and hard-hitting that they can be considered de-facto comprehensive embargoes (or comprehensive sanctions) .
-Recent sanctions regimes This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they may share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating those countries' [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination self-determination]. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
+In the case of sanctions targeting banking sectors, compliance is facilitated by the fact that, while superficially appearing to be multinational, banks are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they may share a common brand. In the case of the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet, compliance with diverse sanctions regimes is rendered much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating those countries' [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination self-determination]. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
 At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]].

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 === Why does this project exist? ===
-Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years], but their use has become particularly widespread in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Most sanctions used since Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United Nations. Over the past 20 years, however, impasse at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional organisations also use their own autonomous (or unilateral) sanctions.  These can supplement multilateral (UN) sanctions, or can be imposed entirely in their absence. The United States (US) is the most prolific user of autonomous sanctions, followed by the European Union (EU). A number of other nations, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and Japan also use autonomous sanctions; often in close coordination with one another. All regional organisations (such as the African Union and the League of Arab States) use sanctions against their own members, but the EU is the only one to use it as a tool of external foreign and security policy.
+Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years], but their use has become particularly widespread in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Most sanctions used since the Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United Nations. Over the past 20 years, however, impasse at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional organisations also use their own autonomous (or unilateral) sanctions.  These can supplement multilateral (UN) sanctions, or can be imposed entirely in their absence. All sanctions regimes employed today are supposed to be "targeted" or "smart" (geared to only impact on certain targets and not a country's entire population).
-In contemporary times private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they may share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating those countries' [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination self-determination]. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
+The United States (US) is the most prolific user of autonomous sanctions, followed by the European Union (EU). A number of other nations, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and Japan also use autonomous sanctions; often in close coordination with one another. All regional organisations (such as the African Union and the League of Arab States) use sanctions against their own members, but the EU is the only one to use it as a tool of external foreign and security policy.
 At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]].

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 === Why does this project exist? ===
-National governments have used sanctions as a deescalatory punitive measure for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years]. The private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they may share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating those countries' [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination self-determination]. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
+Sanctions have been used as a tool of statecraft for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years], but their use has become particularly widespread in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Most sanctions used since Second World War and until the start of the new Millennium were employed through the United Nations. Over the past 20 years, however, impasse at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has meant that a number of national governments and regional organisations also use their own autonomous (or unilateral) sanctions.  These can supplement multilateral (UN) sanctions, or can be imposed entirely in their absence. The United States (US) is the most prolific user of autonomous sanctions, followed by the European Union (EU). A number of other nations, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and Japan also use autonomous sanctions; often in close coordination with one another. All regional organisations (such as the African Union and the League of Arab States) use sanctions against their own members, but the EU is the only one to use it as a tool of external foreign and security policy.
 At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]].

@@ Line 23: / Line 23: @@
 * An [[Operations Group|'''operations group''']] keeps the BGP and RPZ feed publishing mechanisms working and gather feedback from implementers.
-* A [[Research Group|'''research group''']] is responsible for metrics and monitoring of the system and its effectiveness, and liaise with the academic community.
+* A [[Research Group|'''research group''']] is responsible for metrics and monitoring of the system and its effectiveness, and liaises with the academic community.
 === Participation ===

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 === Why does this project exist? ===
-National governments have used sanctions as a deescalatory punitive measure for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years]. The private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating their [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of self-determination. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
+National governments have used sanctions as a deescalatory punitive measure for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years]. The private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating their [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-determination self-determination]. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
-At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]]. This project brings together governments, Internet organizations, civil society, and academia to provide a globally-harmonized Internet sanctions imposition mechanism that combines the expertise and perspectives from different stakeholders to develop proportional and effective sanctions that aim to not impinge upon civilians' access to information and communications. This project is neither pro-sanction nor anti-sanction; it exists to facilitate public-sector/private-sector coordination while ensuring that the human rights of civilians are protected.
+At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]].
 === Origin of the project ===
-This project originated in an [[The Open Letter|open letter]] from leaders of the multistakeholder Internet governance community, calling for constructive dialog about the imposition of Internet-related sanctions, and for a principled, structured, and transparent approach to sanctions, with the explicit aim of maintaining connectivity to civilian populations and responding against those who minimize this.
+This project originated in an [[The Open Letter|open letter]] from leaders of the multistakeholder Internet governance community, calling for constructive dialog about the imposition of Internet-related sanctions, and for a principled, structured, and transparent approach to sanctions, with the explicit aim of maintaining connectivity to civilian populations.
 === Structure ===
 The project is implemented by five working groups:
-* A [[Policy:Policy Group|policy group]] monitors the political situation and the sanction initiatives of national governments, and evaluates whether a situation or proposed sanctions is relevant in light of the project's principles. If a sanction is deemed in-scope, the policy group defines the situation and (potentially) sanctioned entities and passes them to the [[Open Source Intelligence|OSINT group]]. The policy group is responsible for determining the limited scope of measures, analyzing when existing sanctions should be repealed, and for liaising with governments which are considering declaring this mechanism to be sufficient compliance with their nationally-defined sanctions.
+* A [[Policy:Policy Group|'''policy group''']] monitors the political situation and the sanction initiatives of national governments, and evaluates whether a situation or proposed sanctions is relevant in light of the project's principles. If a sanction is deemed in-scope, the policy group defines the situation and (potentially) sanctioned entities and passes them to the [[Open Source Intelligence|OSINT group]]. The policy group is responsible for determining the limited scope of measures, analyzing when existing sanctions should be repealed, and for liaising with governments which are considering declaring this mechanism to be sufficient compliance with their nationally-defined sanctions.
-* An [[Open Source Intelligence|intelligence group]] investigates and catalogs the Internet resources (IP addresses, Autonomous System numbers, and domain names) held by sanctioned entities. This helps the [[Policy Group|policy group]] understand the (potential) impact of measures and assess their proportionality.
+* An [[Open Source Intelligence|'''intelligence group''']] investigates and catalogs the Internet resources (IP addresses, Autonomous System numbers, and domain names) held by sanctioned entities. This helps the [[Policy Group|policy group]] understand the (potential) impact of measures and assess their proportionality.
-* An [[Oversight Board|oversight board]] provides a final check on which resources are included in the blocking feed, verifying its conformity with international and human rights law. When anything is added to the feed, an announcement will be posted to the (read-only) [https://lists.sanctions.net/mailman/listinfo/announce announcement email list], which you're welcome to subscribe to, to keep track of the project's outcomes.
+* An [[Oversight Board|'''oversight board''']] provides a final check on which resources are included in the blocking feed, verifying its conformity with international and human rights law. When anything is added to the feed, an announcement will be posted to the (read-only) [https://lists.sanctions.net/mailman/listinfo/announce announcement email list], which you're welcome to subscribe to, to keep track of the project's outcomes.
-* An [[Operations Group|operations group]] keeps the BGP and RPZ feed publishing mechanisms working and gather feedback from implementers.
+* An [[Operations Group|'''operations group''']] keeps the BGP and RPZ feed publishing mechanisms working and gather feedback from implementers.
-* A [[Research Group|research group]] is responsible for metrics and monitoring of the system and its effectiveness, and liaise with the academic community.
+* A [[Research Group|'''research group''']] is responsible for metrics and monitoring of the system and its effectiveness, and liaise with the academic community.
 === Participation ===

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 __NOTOC__
-This is an [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_standard open], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_governance Internet community governed], project which produces [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Border_Gateway_Protocol BGP] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Response_policy_zone RPZ] feeds of network resources ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address IP addresses], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_system_(Internet) Autonomous System numbers], and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name domain names]) associated with [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_sanctions sanctioned] entities. These feeds facilitate [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_service_provider Internet network operators] in complying with governmentally-mandated sanctions against violators of international and human rights law.
+This is an [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_standard open], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_governance Internet community governed], project which produces real-time [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Border_Gateway_Protocol BGP] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Response_policy_zone RPZ] data feeds of network resources ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address IP addresses], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_system_(Internet) Autonomous System numbers], and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name domain names]) associated with [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_sanctions sanctioned] entities. These data feeds facilitate [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_service_provider Internet network operators] in complying with governmentally-mandated sanctions against violators of international and human rights law.
 === Why does this project exist? ===
-National governments have used sanctions as a deescalatory punitive measure for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years]. The private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities within each country. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has extraterritorial effects in every other country. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
+National governments have used sanctions as a deescalatory punitive measure for [https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/smart-sanctions-a-short-history/ thousands of years]. The private sector within each nation is responsible for enacting sanctions defined by their government. This has historically worked well with banking, since banks (which may superficially appear to be multinational) are actually collections of individual, autonomous, independently-regulated entities, each existing within a single country, though they share a common brand. But the "flat" global, transnational nature of the Internet makes compliance with diverse sanctions regimes much more difficult for Internet organizations. Large Internet networks operate as single networks spanning the world, with unitary policy and technical choices implemented globally. Thus a policy imposed by a single government on a global network, if implemented, has [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction extraterritorial effects] in every other country, violating their [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty Westphalian] rights of self-determination. And conflicting policies imposed by different governments cannot be resolved without breaking the fundamental nature of Internet connectivity.
-At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of expression and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]]. This project brings together governments, Internet organizations, civil society, and academia to provide a globally-harmonized Internet sanctions imposition mechanism that combines the expertise and perspectives from different stakeholders to develop proportional and effective sanctions that aim to not impinge upon civilians' access to information and communications. This project is neither pro-sanction nor anti-sanction; it exists to facilitate public-sector/private-sector coordination while ensuring that the human rights of civilians are protected.
+At the same time, broadly-defined Internet sanctions tend to disproportionately affect the civilian population of sanctioned countries; this is both counterproductive and violates their human rights to freedom of communication and access to information as recognized by [[Policy:Freedom of Expression and Access to Information|the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and others]]. This project brings together governments, Internet organizations, civil society, and academia to provide a globally-harmonized Internet sanctions imposition mechanism that combines the expertise and perspectives from different stakeholders to develop proportional and effective sanctions that aim to not impinge upon civilians' access to information and communications. This project is neither pro-sanction nor anti-sanction; it exists to facilitate public-sector/private-sector coordination while ensuring that the human rights of civilians are protected.
 === Origin of the project ===